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5Introduction
1 Introduction
Germany	is	 in	 the	midst	of	a	debate	on	economic	 inequality	and	distribution	of	wealth.	People	
frequently	mention	a	division	in	society:	Some	groups	find	themselves	facing	stagnating	or	even	
falling	real	wages,	while	others	benefit	from	economic	growth	and	the	shifting	shortages	on	the	
labor	market.	What	factors	can	these	developments	be	attributed	to?
Numerous	 scientific	 studies	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 labor	 market	 institutions	 plays	
a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 inequality	 (Dustmann	 et	 al.	 2009,	 Di	Nardo	 et	 al.	 1996).	
Furthermore,	 the	 scientific	 literature	 refers	 regularly	 to	 the	 role	 of	 technological	 change	 as	
a	 potential	 driver	 of	wage	 inequality	 (Acemoglu	 2002).	 It	was	 long	 thought	 that	 technological	
progress	is	skill-biased	and	therefore	has	a	different	impact	on	employment	demand	for	highly-
skilled	 and	 low-skilled	workers.	 The	 “task-based	 approach”	was	 derived	 from	 that	 theory	 and	
assumes	that	technological	change	leads	to	a	substitution	of	routine	activities	through	computers	
and	machines,	bringing	wage	changes	accordingly	(Acemoglu	and	Autor	2011,	Spitz-Oener	2006).	
Because	routine-based	activities	are	not	necessarily	associated	with	low	qualification	levels	but	
rather	with	primarily	the	middle	range	of	the	skill	and	wage	distribution	(e.g.,	bookkeepers),	this	
approach	has	been	linked	to	increasing	wage	polarization.
Alongside	 the	 above-mentioned	 factors,	 the	 significance	 of	 increasing	 international	
interdependence	for	the	dynamics	and	structure	of	inequality	is	less	obvious	(Fitzenberger	2012,	
OECD	2011).1	This	is	particularly	true	because	the	nature	of	the	international	division	of	labor	has	
changed	substantially	over	the	last	30	years.	Most	German	trade	now	takes	place	within	narrowly	
defined	industries,	that	is,	Germany	is	both	exporter	and	importer	of	very	similar	goods.	Trade	
is	thus	no	longer	inter-	but	rather	intra-industrial	 in	nature.	As	a	result,	however,	conventional	
theories	on	the	correlation	between	inequality	and	trade,	such	as	the	Stolper-Samuelson	theorem,	
have	lost	their	empirical	foundation.	
Traditional	trade	theories	focus	on	the	return	on	education.	According	to	such	theories,	the	return	
on	education	rises	in	highly	developed	countries	such	as	Germany	due	to	the	distribution	of	labor	
with	 less	affluent	countries,	while	 the	value	of	 low	educational	qualifications	or	a	 lack	 thereof	
declines.	However,	studies	show	that	only	about	20	percent	of	the	structure	of	wage	inequality	
can	be	explained	by	this	factor	(Felbermayr	et	al.,	2014).	The	remaining	80	percent	has	more	to	do	
with	the	characteristics	of	the	employer.	This	is	also	consistent	with	new	trade	theory	literature,	
where	the	analysis	focuses	on	companies	–	the	drivers	of	the	globalization	process	–	rather	than	
industries.	
1	 For	a	more	detailed	distinction	between	the	dynamics	and	structure	of	inequality,	see	Box	1.
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Box 1: 
Clarification	on	Terminology	
In	this	study,	we	use	the	terms	inequality	and	wage inequality synonymously.	In	doing	so,	
we	are	referring	to	the	distribution	of	gross	wages	(see	Section	2).
When	we	discuss	the	structure of wage inequality,	we	are	distinguishing	the	contribution	
of	individual	factors	to	wage	inequality.
When	we	speak	of	the	dynamics of wage inequality,	we	are	referring	to	the	development	
of	inequality	in	general,	as	well	as	the	development	of	individual	explanatory	factors	in	
particular	over	time.
Our	 objective	 in	 this	 study	 is	 to	 create	 a	 current,	 explicit	 picture	 of	 the	 development	 of	wage	
inequality	in	Germany.	In	addition,	we	empirically	examine	in	detail	the	correlation	between	the	
international	engagement	of	companies	and	the	trajectory	of	wage	inequality	in	Germany.	With	
this	 analysis,	we	 aim	 to	 produce	 a	well-founded	 assessment	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 growing	
international	 relationships	of	German	companies	 relative	 to	 other	 explanatory	 factors	 (such	as	
changes	in	the	area	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	or	technological	change)	with	regard	to	
increasing	wage	inequality.
The	study	is	designed	as	follows:	Section	2	contains	a	brief	overview	description	of	the	subject	
being	 studied	 and	 the	 data	 used.	 Section	 3	 has	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 wage	
inequality,	 including	 an	 analysis	 of	 individual	 regions	 and	 industries,	 as	 well	 as	 inequality	
analyzed	 according	 to	 demographic	 variables.	 In	 Section	 4,	we	 use	 variance	 decomposition	 to	
examine	which	group	reports	the	largest	increase	in	inequality.	In	Section	5,	we	turn	to	the	effect	
of	company	characteristics	and	discuss	in	particular	the	role	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	
and	the	 international	engagement	of	companies.	 In	Section	6,	we	quantify	 the	contributions	of	
individual	factors	to	the	development	of	wage	inequality	and	differentiate	the	roles	of	international	
trade,	collective	bargaining	agreements	and	investments	in	new	technologies.	Finally,	in	Section	7	
we	examine	the	connection	between	international	trade	and	inequality	on	a	sectoral	level,	before	
summarizing	the	economic	policy	implications	in	Section	8.
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2 Subject overview and data used 
In	 order	 to	 create	 the	most	 comprehensive,	 robust	 and	 up-to-date	 picture	 of	 the	 inequality	 in	
Germany	 as	 possible,	 we	 are	 drawing	 on	 data	 sources	 for	 this	 study	 that	 have	 already	 been	
established	in	the	academic	literature	for	this	field	(Dustmann	et	al.	2009,	Card	et	al.	2013).	Our	
analysis	 is	based	on	data	 from	 the	Sample	of	 Integrated	Labor	Market	Biographies	 (SIAB)	and	
the	Linked	Employer	Employee	Database	(LIAB),	as	provided	by	the	Federal	Employment	Agency	
(Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit).	The	majority	of	this	data	stems	from	legally	binding	social	security	
registrations.	Advantages	of	this	database	include	its	large	sample	size	and	its	reliability	due	to	
its	administrative	character.	Complete	data	was	available	through	2010	at	the	time	this	study	was	
compiled.
Box 2:
Different	income	concepts	
Market	income
	 	 Earned	wages	
	 	 Capital	income	
+	Annuities	and	pensions	
+	Government	transfer	payments	
–	Taxes	and	social	insurance	contributions	
=	disposable	income	
In	 addition	 to	 different	 types	 of	 income,	 a	 distinction	 can	be	made	with	 respect	 to	 the	
individual	 income	approach	and	 the	household	 income	approach.	The	 income	situation	
of	 households	 is	 made	 comparable	 –	 consistently	 with	 international	 standards	 –	 by	
converting	the	total	income	of	a	household	into	equivalized	incomes.	For	more	information,	
see	OECD	(2011).
Our	analyses	of	 the	structure	and	dynamics	of	 inequality	are	 thus	based	on	gross	wages	 from	
workers	covered	by	social	security,	in	other	words,	wages	before	deduction	of	taxes	and	any	transfer	
payments.	 Accordingly,	 they	 reflect	 direct	 wage	 payments	 on	 the	 labor	market.	 Using	 earned	
wages	as	the	foundation	of	our	analysis	is	sensible	from	our	perspective	because	it	accounts	for	
about	75	percent	of	total	income	(Statistisches	Bundesamt	2013a,	OECD	2011)	and	we	expect	that	
the	potential	effects	of	the	individual	influencing	factors	will	be	felt	most	directly	here.	We	use	the	
terms	inequality	and	wage	inequality	synonymously.	Box	2	shows	the	various	income	concepts.	
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We	would	 like	 to	note	here	 that	–	as	 is	common	 in	 the	academic	 literature	–	we	are	 referring	
to	 wage	 developments	 for	 full-time	 workers	 (see	 also	 Fitzenberger	 2012).2	 Accordingly,	 we	
only	 examine	 those	 effects	 on	 wage	 inequality	 that	 result	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 remuneration	
of	 employees	 subject	 to	 social	 security	 assessments.	 Not	 considered,	 therefore,	 are	 effects	 on	
inequality	due	to	changes	in	working	time	or	the	employment	structure	(e.g.,	loss	of	employment,	
new	employment	relationships).	
2	 A	detailed	description	of	the	databases	used	and	their	processing	can	be	found	at	the	end	of	the	study.
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3 The trend in German wage inequality
In	 recent	 decades,	 inequality	 has	 risen	 in	many	 developed	 economies	 (Katz	 and	 Autor	 1999,	
Machin	 and	 Van	 Reenen	 2008,	 OECD	 2011).	 For	 a	 long	 time	 it	 was	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	
among	economists	 that	no	 comparable	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	had	 occurred	 in	Germany.	 This	
was	often	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	the	inflexibility	of	the	German	labor	market	and	one	cause	of	
its	 comparatively	high	unemployment	 (Prasad	2004).	More	 recent	 studies,	 however,	 show	 that	
inequality	has	also	increased	noticeably	in	Germany	(e.g.	Dustmann	et	al.	2009,	Card	et	al.	2013).
The	Gini	coefficient	is	a	commonly	used	measure	for	inequality.	It	can	take	values	between	zero	
and	 one.	 The	 higher	 the	 value,	 the	 higher	 the	measured	 inequality	 is	 considered	 to	 be.	More	
suited	for	analytical	purposes,	however,	is	the	standard	deviation	of	wages.3	It	is	derived	from	the	
variance,	which	itself	can	be	more	easily	broken	down	into	individual	components.
3	 	As	is	common	in	the	literature,	we	use	the	logarithm	of	real	wages.	This	prevents	the	measure	of	inequality	from	depending	on	
the	choice	of	unit	of	calculation.
Figure 1: Development of wage inequality in Germany
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years.
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Figure	1	shows	the	development	of	 inequality	for	Germany	using	the	standard	deviation	of	 log	
real	wages	and	the	Gini	coefficient.4	Both	measures	of	 inequality	reflect	 the	same	trend.	From	
the	mid-1980s	 to	 the	mid-1990s,	virtually	no	 increase	 in	 inequality	 is	 recognizable.	Starting	 in	
1996,	however,	the	growth	rate	increased	noticeably.	A	short	decline	in	inequality	can	be	observed	
for	2009.	By	2010,	however,	the	higher	level	from	2008	is	reached	again.	Based	on	the	standard	
deviation	of	 log	real	wages,	the	overall	wage	inequality	in	Germany	grew	by	12	log	percentage	
points	from	1985	to	2010.	The	majority	of	this	rise,	11	log	percentage	points,	occurred	within	just	
15	years	 (from	1996	to	2010).	Comparisons	 to	other	national	economies	revealed	 that	 this	was	
indeed	 a	 considerable	 increase.	 For	 example,	 the	Anglo-Saxon	 economies	 (USA,	Great	 Britain,	
Canada	–	economies	that	are	typically	considered	very	unequal	and	associated	with	the	greatest	
increases	–	only	incurred	a	growth	of	6	to	8	log	percentage	points	from	1985	to	2005.	As	such,	
they	 remain	 behind	Germany	with	 regard	 to	 the	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	 in	Germany.	 Table	 1	
provides	an	overview	of	the	growth	of	 inequality	in	the	Anglo-Saxon	economies.5	Although	the	
level	of	wage	inequality	in	Germany	in	2005	was	significantly	lower	than	the	USA	and	Canada,	it	
was	almost	even	with	Great	Britain.
4	 	Through	1991	the	data	refers	to	West	Germany,	thereafter	to	all	of	Germany.	In	section	3.3	of	the	study	the	differences	between	
East	and	West	Germany	are	examined	in	more	detail.
5	 Unfortunately,	comparative	data	is	only	available	through	and	including	2005.
Table 1: Wage inequality in Anglo-Saxon economies and Germany
 Year Standard deviation Year Standard deviation
USA* 1985 0.60 Canada 1985 0.62
1990 0.62 1990 0.62
1995 0.66 1995 0.62
2000 0.66 2000 0.67
2005 0.68 2005 0.68
Great Britain 1985 0.50 Germany** 1985 0.45
1990 0.55 1990 0.46
1995 0.55 1995 0.46
2000 0.57 2000 0.50
2005 0.56 2005 0.54
    2010 0.57
*The data refers exclusively to men. 
**Up to and including 1990, the data refers solely to West Germany; afterward to all of Germany.
Note: The data comes from the following sources: USA: Heathcote et al. (2010); Great Britain: Blundell et al. (2010); 
Canada: Brzozowski et al. (2010); Germany: own calculations.
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Figure	2	shows	the	wage	development	at	different	percentiles	of	the	wage	distribution	indexed	
for	the	year	1992.6	The	median	income7	of	full-time	workers	rose	slightly	from	1992	to	the	early	
2000s.	From	2003	to	2008,	however,	 it	declined,	so	 that	 in	2008	 it	was	back	to	 its	1997	 level.	
Since	then,	the	median	income	has	stabilized	at	this	level.	If	we	also	look	at	the	20th	and	80th	
percentiles,	the	corresponding	developments	at	the	lower	and	higher	ends	of	the	wage	distribution	
can	be	seen.	From	1992	to	1996,	real	wages	in	the	lower	part	of	the	distribution	(20th	percentile)	
rose	more	 sharply	 than	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 distribution.	 Overall,	wage	 inequality	 in	 this	 period	
declined	slightly.	
Starting	in	the	mid-1990s,	there	was	a	reversal	in	this	development:	Income	at	the	80th	percentile	
has	risen	sharply,	while	wages	at	the	20th	percentile	have	fallen.	Thus,	this	development	does	not	
indicate	a	polarization	of	wages,	meaning	a	decline	in	wages	in	the	middle	of	the	loan	distribution	
relative	to	wages	at	the	periphery	of	the	distribution.8
The	lower	range	of	income	distribution	is	especially	susceptible	to	the	trend	from	2003	through	
2008,	which	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 low-wage	 sector.	 Likewise,	 the	
short-term	decrease	in	wage	inequality	in	2009	can	be	traced	back	to	developments	in	the	lower	
distribution	range.
6	 The	“X”	percentile	refers	to	the	level	of	pay	not	exceeded	by	“x”	percent	of	the	workforce.
7	 	The	median,	also	called	the	50th	percentile,	describes	 the	value	of	 the	 income	distribution	that	separates	 the	better	earning	
half	of	 the	population	 from	the	worse	earning	half.	50	percent	of	 income	earners	are	 thus	below	this	value,	and	50	percent	
correspondingly	above	it.
8	 	By	contrast,	the	US	labor	market	shows	this	type	of	wage	polarization,	see	e.g.,	Firpo	et	al.	(2014).	Spitz-Oener	(2006),	Dustmann	
et	al.	(2009)	and	Antonczyk	et	al.	(2009)	analyze	the	polarization	hypothesis	for	Germany	more	closely.	Their	evidence	supports	
the	polarization	hypothesis	for	employment,	but	not	for	wages.
Figure 2: Indexed development of real wages 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The data refers to all of Germany. The underlying sample in-cludes full-time employees between the ages of 
18 to 65 years. All real wages were indexed to the year 1992 (1992=100). Note: The wage information in the original data is cut off at the social 
security contribution limit. Using well-established imputation procedures, we estimate the actual wages for these cases. Per year, between 9 and 14 
percent of the values are cut off, so that the 80th percentile is not affected.
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3.1 The role of residual wage inequality
What	factors	can	explain	such	a	continuous	increase	in	wage	inequality?	In	seminal	works,	Katz	
and	Murphy	(1992)	as	well	as	Bound	and	Johnson	(1992)	found	that	for	the	US	labor	market,	a	
large	portion	of	the	rise	in	inequality	took	place	within	conventional	skills	groups.	This	finding	
has	been	confirmed	for	other	economies	as	well,9	including	the	German	labor	market.	Personal	
characteristics	such	as	age,	education	and	gender,	as	well	as	regional	affiliation	to	East	or	West	
Germany,	explain	only	about	20	percent	of	wage	 inequality	over	 the	 time	period	 from	1985	 to	
2010.	
Figure	3	shows	the	standard	deviation	of	log	real	wages	and	the	trend	for	residual	wage	inequality.	This	
measure	of	residual	wage	inequality	is	calculated	by	running	regressions	of	log	real	wages	on	indicator	
variables	of	 three	education	groups,	 five	age	groups,	 their	 interactions	and	 indicators	 for	gender	and	
region	for	each	year	separately.	We	treat	the	standard	deviation	of	the	residual	wage	as	a	measure	of	the	
unexplained	part	of	the	entire	inequality.10	What	is	striking	is	not	only	that	the	characteristics	investigated	
explain	only	such	a	small	proportion,	but	also	that	the	rise	in	inequality	actually	occurred	within	these	
skills	groups.	
9	 For	example,	Helpman	et	al.	(2012)	for	Brazil	and	Akerman	et	al.	(2013)	for	Sweden.	
10	 The	observed	wage	thus	consists	of	a	segment	that	can	be	explained	by	these	characteristics	and	a	residual	part.
Figure 3: Trend in residual wage inequality
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years. We calculate residual inequality by running yearly regressions of log real wages on indicator 
variables of three education groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65), their interaction terms and indicator 
variables for gender and West Germany.
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3.2 The role of macroeconomic events
What	role	do	macroeconomic	events	play	in	the	development	of	wage	inequality	in	Germany?	A	
decisive	event	for	the	German	labor	market	was	the	reunification	of	East	and	West	Germany	and	
the	fall	of	the	Iron	Curtain.	On	the	one	hand,	German	reunification,	which	was	completed	from	
an	economic	perspective	 in	 June	1990,	 resulted	 in	an	enormous	burden	 for	 the	whole	German	
economy	(Dustmann	et	al.	2014).	The	Council	of	Experts	estimated	the	amount	of	the	net	transfer	
payments	from	West	to	East	Germany	at	about	900	billion	EUR	(Sachverständigenrat	2004).11	On	
the	other	hand,	reunification	was	related	to	a	supply	shock	of	new	workers	for	the	German	labor	
market	(Card	et	al.	2013).	These	developments	went	hand	in	hand	with	the	growing	opening	of	the	
central	and	Eastern	European	economies	after	the	fall	of	the	Iron	Curtain.12	This	offered	increasing	
opportunities	for	German	companies	to	shift	their	production	abroad.	For	Dustmann	et	al.	(2014),	
the	burden	of	Germany’s	reunification	and	new	opportunities	for	outsourcing	production	were	key	
factors	for	generating	wage	restraint	and	increased	competitiveness	in	Germany.	
11	 These	values	refer	to	the	time	period	from	1991	to	2003.
12	 	The	 free	 trade	agreement	of	 the	EU	with	Poland,	Hungary,	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia,	Bulgaria	and	Rumania	came	 into	 force	
during	the	mid	to	late	1990s.
Figure 4: Macroeconomic events
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Shown is the standard deviation of log real wages for West Germany (1985 to 2010) and all of Germany 
(1992 to 2010). The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years. Unemployment rate data is from the Federal 
Employ-ment Agency.
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Figure	4	shows	the	development	of	inequality	(left	axis)	together	with	the	unemployment	
rate	trend	(right	axis)	and	important	macroeconomic	events	between	1985	and	2010.
After	the	German	reunification,	no	new	trend	in	wage	inequality	was	observed,	but	there	
was	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate.	 The	 subsequent	 general	 economic	
recession	and	the	continued	rise	in	the	unemployment	rate	led	to	the	labor	market	reforms	
in	1996	“to	promote	growth	and	employment.”	As	part	of	this	law,	the	duration	of	temporary	
contracts	 was	 increased	 from	 one	 to	 two	 years,	 the	 company	 size	 for	 protection	 against	
dismissal	 rose	 from	 five	 to	 ten	 employees,	 and	 sick	 leave	 payments	 fell	 from	 100	 to	 80	
percent.	These	measures	to	improve	flexibility	at	the	employer	level	were	accompanied	by	
a	loosening	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	as	cited	by	Dustmann	et	al.	(2014).13	In	the	
aftermath	of	 this	 liberalization,	 the	unemployment	 rate	declined,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
the	dispersion	of	wages	increased.	
With	 the	 economic	 downturn	 in	 2001,	 pressure	 for	 labor	market	 reform	 again	 increased.	 This	
occurred	at	the	same	time	as	China’s	entry	into	the	WTO.	The	Hartz	reforms	were	subsequently	
implemented	in	2003,	2004	and	2005,	which	restructured	employment	services	and	were	linked	
to	 substantial	 changes	 in	benefits.	While	 clearly	positive	effects	 can	be	seen	 in	 the	downward	
trend	of	the	unemployment	rate	after	2005,	it	is	also	evident	that	in	both	2003	and	in	2005,	wage	
inequality	rose	in	the	lower	tail	of	the	wage	distribution.	In	2004,	ten	new	central	and	Eastern	
European	economies	joined	the	EU.
3.3 Trend in wage inequality in different regions and industries
If	we	examine	the	trend	in	wage	inequality	separately	in	East	and	West	Germany,	it	can	be	seen	
that	the	regions	scarcely	differ	(Figure	5).	However,	the	level	of	wage	inequality	in	East	Germany	
is	noticeably	lower	than	in	the	West.
13	 The	structure	and	development	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	in	Germany	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Section	5.1
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An	 analysis	 of	 individual	 federal	 states	 shows	 that	 Berlin	 recorded	 the	 sharpest	 rise	 in	 wage	
inequality	 in	 the	 period	 from	1992	 to	 2010	 (Figure	 6).	 A	 similar	 trend	 is	 found	 for	Hamburg,	
while	a	high	 level	of	wage	 inequality	 is	also	present	 in	Bremen,	with	a	sharp	rise	 in	 the	mid-
2000s.	Regarding	the	more	populous	federal	states,	the	wage	dispersion	in	Hesse	is	much	greater	
than	in	other	states.	If	we	look	at	the	development	of	wage	inequality	in	various	sectors	of	the	
economy,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	 the	 tele-communications	 industry,	 which	 includes	 the	 postal	 and	
telecommunications	services,	shows	by	far	the	sharpest	rise	in	inequality.	A	sharp	rise	in	wage	
dispersion	can	also	be	seen	in	the	aviation	industry.	The	trends	in	wage	inequality	in	the	various	
industries	are	presented	in	the	Appendix.	
Figure 5: Trend in inequality in East and West Germany
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years separately by East 
and West Germany.
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Figure 6: Trend in inequality by federal state 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years by federal state.
Schleswig-Holstein Hamburg Bremen SaarlandNiedersachsen Berlin
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
North Rhine-Westphalia Hesse Baden-Württemberg BavariaRhineland-Palatinate
Brandenburg Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Saxony-Anhalt ThuringiaSaxony
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
17
The trend in German wage inequality
3.4 Trend in wage inequality across demographic variables
Besides	the	regional	and	industry-specific	analysis	of	wage	inequality,	it	is	also	interesting	how	
wage	inequality	has	developed	across	demographic	variables	such	as	gender	or	education.	
Figure	 7	 shows	 the	 trend	 separately	 for	 men	 and	 women.	 For	 male	 employees,	 there	 was	 a	
continuous	rise	in	inequality	even	during	the	1980s	and	more	seriously	since	the	early	1990s.	For	
female	employees,	on	the	other	hand,	the	level	of	wage	inequality	remained	fairly	constant	from	
the	mid-1980s	to	the	mid-1990s.	Only	since	1996	has	there	been	a	clear	rise	in	inequality	among	
women.	Moreover,	it	becomes	clear	that	for	a	long	time,	the	level	of	inequality	among	women	was	
always	greater	 than	 that	among	men.	 In	2008	and	2010,	both	groups	showed	a	similarly	high	
level.14	
14	 	The	differences	presented	between	men	and	women	cannot	be	explained	by	differences	in	full-time	and	part-time	work,	because	
the	analysis	exclusively	considers	full-time	workers.
Figure 7: Total and residual wage inequality in men and women 
a) Men
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years, separately for men and women. Residual inequality is calculated by running yearly 
regressions of log real wages on indicator variables of three educational groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 
56-65), their interaction terms and an indicator variable for West Germany.
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Figure	7	also	shows	how	residual	inequality	for	men	and	women	follows	a	similar	trend	to	overall	
inequality.	This	implies	that	a	large	portion	of	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	cannot	be	explained	by	
age	and	education	but	occurs	within	age	and	educational	groups.	One	difference,	however,	is	that	
for	women,	age	and	education	variables	explain	far	less	of	the	structure	of	wage	inequality	than	
for	men.
Next,	we	look	at	the	trend	in	inequality	for	individual	education	groups	separately	(Figure	8).	We	
distinguish	between	low-skilled,	medium-skilled	and	highly-skilled	workers	(Box	3).	
Figure 7: Total and residual wage inequality in men and women 
a) Men
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years, separately for men and women. Residual inequality is calculated by running yearly 
regressions of log real wages on indicator variables of three educational groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 
56-65), their interaction terms and an indicator variable for West Germany.
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The	 lowest	 level	 of	 wage	 inequality	 was	 found	 among	 low-skilled	 workers.	 However,	 wage	
dispersion	increased	more	sharply	in	this	group	starting	in	the	mid	1990s	than	among	medium-
skilled	workers.	While	 inequality	among	highly-skilled	employees	 in	1990s	was	partially	 lower	
than	among	medium-skilled	employees,	wage	dispersion	among	graduates	of	technical	colleges	
and	universities	starting	in	the	year	2000	has	grown	sharply	and	now	exceeds	the	level	of	the	
other	two	groups.15	If	we	control	for	age,	gender	and	region,	the	results	remain	qualitatively	the	
same	(not	shown).
A	 corresponding	 analysis	 can	 be	 done	 using	 the	 variable	 of	 nationality	 (Figure	 9).	 Here	 we	
differentiate	 between	German	 and	 non-German	 employees.	We	 first	 look	 at	 the	 trend	 in	wage	
inequality	 separately	 for	 these	 two	 groups,	 without	 controlling	 for	 other	 characteristics,	
(Specification	A).	In	this	case,	the	dispersion	of	wages	of	German	citizens	from	the	early	1990s	
to	the	mid	2000s	has	been	higher	than	that	of	those	without	German	citizenship.	However,	from	
2006	onwards,	the	level	of	inequality	among	non-German	citizens	is	higher	than	that	of	German	
citizens,	suggesting	that	 inequality	among	non-German	citizens	has	had	a	significantly	greater	
dynamic.	 Controlling	 for	 additional	 variables	 of	 age,	 education	 status,	 gender	 and	 region	 of	
Germany	(Specification	B),	the	level	of	wage	inequality	among	German	and	non-German	citizens	
is	the	same	between	1993	and	1999,	but	thereafter,	the	group	of	non-German	citizens	sees	a	larger	
rise	in	inequality.
15	 	Since	wages	are	cut	off	at	the	social	security	contribution	limit,	a	large	share	of	wages	within	the	group	of	highly-skilled	workers	
is	subject	to	our	imputation	procedure.
Figure 8: Inequality across educational groups 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Data refers to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 
65 years, separated by level of education. In the speci-ﬁcation shown, we look at the trend for “unconditional” inequality by group. In other 
speciﬁcations, we control for age group, gender and region. The resulting structure is similar.
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Box 3:
Classification	of	educational	groups
Low-skilled workers:
	 High-school	diploma	at	most	and	no	vocational	training
Medium-skilled workers:
	 High-school	diploma	at	most	and	vocational	training	
	 or
	 “Abitur”	qualification	for	university	entrance	without	vocational	training	
	 or
	 “Abitur”	qualification	for	university	entrance	with	vocational	training
Highly-skilled workers:
	 University	diploma	
	 or	technical	college	diploma
These	results	suggest	that	the	demographic	shifts	in	Germany	could	explain	a	portion	of	the	rise	
in	total	inequality,	because	the	share	of	groups	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	workforce	within	which	
inequality	is	comparatively	high	(skilled	workers,	women	and	worker	with	foreign	citizenship)	has	
risen	over	time.	In	the	next	section,	we	will	examine	total	inequality.
Figure 9: Inequality by citizenship
Source: See comments to Figure 8. Speciﬁcation (A) reﬂects the “unconditional” trend in inequality per group; in speciﬁcation (B), we control for age 
group, education group, gender and region.
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4 Analysis of wage variance 
To	gain	better	 insight	 into	 the	contribution	of	single	variables	 to	explaining	 inequality,	we	can	
analyze	the	wage	variance.	The	advantage	of	the	variance	as	a	measure	of	inequality	is	that	it	can	
be	exactly	decomposed	into	two	different	parts.	One	part	refers	to	the	dispersion	within	a	certain	
group	and	the	other	part	refers	to	the	variation	between	different	groups.	Figure	10	clarifies	this	
concept	using	a	fictitious	example	of	companies.	
In	 Panel	 I,	 all	 companies	 are	 identical,	 so	 that	 the	 variance	 in	wages	within	 each	 company	 is	
the	 same	 as	 the	 overall	 variance	 of	 the	 economy.	Accordingly,	 the	 overall	 variance	 is	 entirely	
explained	by	the	dispersion	within	companies.	In	Panel	II,	all	companies	are	different,	and	the	
specific	variance	within	companies	 is	very	small.	The	overall	variance	is	 thus	the	result	of	 the	
wage	dispersion	within	every	company	and	the	differences	in	the	individual	mean	values	between	
the	different	companies.
Figure 10: Wage distribution within and between companies
Source: Own representation modeled according to Lazear and Shaw, 2009. 
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Formally,	the	decomposition	of	the	total	variance	can	be	written	as	follows:
	
2
2 2
.1 1
( )J Jj j j jj jp p w wσ σ= == + −∑ ∑
,
in	which	pj	represents	the	share	of	all	employees	in	group	(here	company),	j,	!!
!  2j	is	the	variance	
within	group	(company)	j,	w 	describes	the	average	wage	in	group	(company)	j	and	w drepresents	
the	average	wage	in	the	whole	economy.	This	means	that	the	variance	of	wages	in	an	economy	is	
large	if	(1)	the	mean	wage	is	very	different	between	companies	or	(2)	when	the	variance	in	wages	
within	companies	is	high	or	(3)	if	both	are	the	case.
We	conducted	a	respective	decomposition	for	2000	and	2010	along	different	dimensions	or	groups.	
In	particular,	we	look	at	what	share	of	the	wage	variance	can	be	attributed	to	a	dispersion	between	
skill	groups	and	what	share	reflects	the	dispersion	within	skill	groups.16	Accordingly,	we	analyze	
the	wage	variance	along	occupational	groups	and	companies.17	Table	2	shows	in	each	case	the	
share	of	the	complete	variance	that	can	be	explained	by	the	variation	within	each	of	the	groups	
and	between	the	groups.	In	addition,	we	also	show	the	share	of	the	particular	components	in	the	
change	in	total	wage	inequality.
First	 of	 all,	 as	we	observe	 the	decomposition	across	 skill	 groups	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	 the	
dispersion	between	skill	groups	has	increased	by	37	percent,	but	the	major	share	of	the	rise	in	
total	wage	 inequality	has	 taken	place	within	age	and	education	groups	 (63	percent).	A	similar	
pattern	 results	 for	 occupational	 groups.	45	percent	 of	 the	 total	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	 can	be	
traced	to	the	dispersion	between	occupational	groups,	while	55	percent	of	the	rise	is	explained	by	
an	increase	in	the	dispersion	within	occupational	groups.
Another	picture	 results,	however,	 if	we	 look	at	 the	company	component.	Here	 the	portion	 that	
reflects	 the	 variance	between	businesses	 is	 clearly	 larger:	Nearly	 three-quarters	 of	 the	 rise	 in	
inequality	during	the	period	observed	has	taken	place	between	companies,	and	only	one	quarter	
within	companies.	Thus	differences	between	companies	seem	to	play	an	 important	role	 for	 the	
wage	inequality	trend	in	Germany.	Similar	results	were	already	reported	by	Baumgarten	(2013)	
for	1996	and	2007.	Card	et	al.	(2013)	also	suggest	in	their	work	the	importance	of	the	company	
component	in	explaining	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	in	Germany.	We	will	take	a	detailed	look	at	
the	company	components	in	the	following.
16	 Skill	groups	are	defined	by	the	interaction	of	five	age	groups	and	three	education	groups.
17	 	In	the	dataset	used,	we	have	information	exclusively	about	businesses.	Companies	can	consist	of	several	businesses.	However,	in	
the	following,	we	use	the	terms	business	and	company	synonymously.
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Table 2: Variance decomposition: inequality trends
2000 Share of 
variance 
2010 Share of 
variance 
Change Share of 
change 
Total variance 0.232 0.301 0.069
Between skill groups 0.044 19 0.070 23 0.026 37
Within skill groups 0.187 81 0.231 77 0.043 63
Between occupational groups 0.081 35 0.112 37 0.031 45
Within occupational groups 0.151 65 0.189 63 0.038 55
Between companies 0.141 61 0.192 64 0.051 74
Within companies 0.090 39 0.108 36 0.018 26
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB and LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 
18 to 65 years in all of Germany. Skill groups result from the interaction of five age and three education groups. Using the 
1988 occupations classification, we distinguish 343 different occupational groups.
24
The role of company characteristics
5 The role of company characteristics
Which	company	characteristics	 are	 relevant	 for	 the	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	 in	Germany	and	can	
explain	 the	significance	of	company	components	 in	 the	previous	variance	decomposition?	 In	 the	
following	sections,	we	will	take	a	detailed	look	at	two	essential	developments	at	the	company	level	
that	occurred	in	parallel	to	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	in	Germany:	changes	in	the	way	wages	are	
negotiated	and	the	integration	of	German	companies	into	the	global	market.
5.1 Trends in collective bargaining
Free	collective	bargaining	 is	practiced	 in	Germany,	 in	which	unions	and	employer	associations	
have	a	constitutionally-guaranteed	right	to	negotiate	agreements	with	a	normative	effect	and	free	
of	government	intervention	through	labor	and	economic	conditions	(Bispinck	2007).	This	applies	
in	particular	to	collective	bargaining	agreements.	Unlike	many	other	economies,	wage	policy	in	
Germany	is	not	created	in	a	“government	policy”	process,	but	rather	is	based	on	contracts	and	
mutual	agreements	between	employer	associations,	unions	and	works	councils.	Fundamentally,	
there	are	 two	different	 forms	of	collective	bargaining	 in	Germany:	association	or	 industry-wide	
collective	agreements	and	company-level	agreements	(Bispinck	2007).	
As	Table	3	shows,	the	role	of	industry	collective	agreements	in	Germany	has	steadily	declined	since	
the	mid-1990s	–	a	development	explained	primarily	by	the	decrease	in	these	agreements.18	While	
in	1996,	some	70	percent	of	all	(full-time)	employment	relationships	were	tied	to	such	collective	
agreements;	 in	 2010	 it	was	 only	 50	 percent.	 The	 share	 of	 employees	 tied	 to	 such	 agreements	
sank	during	this	period	from	12	to	10	percent.19	In	addition	to	this	general	decline	of	collective	
bargaining	agreements,	escape	and	hardship	clauses	have	become	more	common	since	the	mid-
1990s,	 giving	 greater	 bargaining	 leeway	 to	 even	 those	 companies	 tied	 to	 collective	 bargaining	
agreements	(Brändle	et	al.	2011,	Bispinck	et	al.	2010).	
Overall,	 therefore,	 the	 importance	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 has	 decreased	 sharply.	
Dustmann	et	al.	(2014)	call	this	process	of	decentralization	of	wage	bargaining	from	the	industry	
to	 the	 individual	 firm	 the	 “increasing	 localization”	 of	 the	 wage-setting	 process	 (p.	 168).	 This	
corroborates	the	increasing	importance	of	company-specific	components	in	wage	setting.	
18	 Information	on	collective	bargaining	agreements	is	available	starting	in	1996.
19	 Consideration	of	the	company	level	paints	a	similar	picture,	see	Table	2.
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5.2 The role of collective agreements for wage payments 
As	 existing	 studies	 show,	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 can	 affect	 the	 average	 wage	 level	
of	 covered	 employment	 relationships	 relative	 to	uncovered	 relationships	 (Card	1996).	 Through	
this	channel,	wage	inequality	is	influenced	by	the	different	average	wages	between	employment	
relationships	secured	by	a	collective	bargaining	agreement	and	those	that	are	not.	 In	addition,	
collective	 wage	 agreements	 reduce	 the	 dispersion	 of	 wages	 within	 the	 group	 of	 covered	
employment	 relationships.	Consequently,	 this	 channel	 also	 exercises	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 total	
wage	dispersion.
In	the	following,	we	consider	the	first	channel	and	examine	the	extent	to	which	collective	bargaining	
agreements	are	associated	with	a	higher	average	wage	–	a	wage	premium.	We	conducted	simple	
wage	 regressions	 in	 which	 we	 ran	 for	 each	 year	 a	 separate	 regression	 of	 the	 log	 real	 wages	
on	 individual	 characteristics	 and	 other	 indicator	 variables	 for	 region,	 industry	 and	 nationality	
(Specification	 A).	 By	 doing	 this,	 the	 wage	 premium	 indicates	 the	 percentage	 supplement	 to	
the	wages	 of	 a	 comparable	 employee	 in	 a	 company	without	 a	 collective	 agreement.	 This	wage	
supplement	from	collective	agreements	in	the	period	from	1996	to	2010	lies	between	eight	and	19	
percent	and	shows	a	clear	rise	since	1999	(Figure	11).	
Table 3: Trends in collective bargaining agreements in Germany
Company Level Employee level
Industry  
collective 
agreement 
(in %)
Company level 
agreement  
(in %)
Collective  
agreements 
overall (in %)
Industry  
collective 
agreement 
(in %)
Company level 
agreement  
(in %)
Collective  
agreements 
overall (in %)
1996 49 11 60 70 12 82
1997 49 11 60 68 14 82
1998 47 5 52 67 9 76
1999 43 4 47 64 9 73
2000 44 3 47 63 8 70
2001 43 4 47 60 8 68
2002 43 3 45 60 8 68
2003 41 3 45 60 9 69
2004 41 3 43 59 8 67
2005 38 3 41 57 9 66
2006 37 3 40 55 10 65
2007 35 3 38 55 9 64
2008 34 3 37 53 10 62
2009 35 4 39 52 11 63
2010 33 3 35 52 10 62
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes all branches of the economy for all of Germany. 
Weighting factors are considered.
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If	we	additionally	 control	 for	 other	 company	 characteristics	 (sales	 (Specification	B),	 number	 of	
employees	(Specification	C)),	the	premium	is	much	lower	(between	one	and	ten	percent)	but	still	
rose	 during	 the	 period.	 The	 lower	wage	 premium	may	 be	 partially	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 larger	
companies	are	more	 likely	 to	be	subject	 to	collective	agreements.	However,	as	company	size	 is	
already	associated	with	higher	wages,	if	we	only	compare	the	wages	at	companies	of	similar	size	
against	each	other,	the	pay	differential	between	companies	with	collective	agreements	and	ones	
without	is	smaller.20
5.3 Trends in exports
While	the	importance	of	collective	bargaining	has	noticeably	declined	in	German	companies	over	
the	 last	 two	decades,	 international	 interdependence	has	become	substantially	more	significant.	
In	particular	in	Germany,	exports	have	assumed	a	central	role	as	the	driver	of	economic	growth.	
In	the	period	from	2000	to	2010	alone,	total	export	volumes	rose	by	nearly	60	percent	(Federal	
Statistical	Office,	2014).
This	trend	is	also	reflected	at	the	company	level	in	the	manufacturing	industry.	Whereas	in	2000,	
19	percent	of	all	companies	in	the	manufacturing	sector	earned	a	portion	of	their	sales	abroad,	
by	2010	nearly	30	percent	did	so.	But	not	only	has	 the	number	of	exporting	companies	 in	 the	
20	 	Addison	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 is	 a	 current	 study	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 wage	 premium	 in	 Germany	 and	 differentiates	 between	 industry	
agreements	and	company-level	agreements.
Figure 11: Trend in the collective bargaining premium
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The sample includes male full-time employees from the man-ufacturing sector. The calculations of the 
premiums below are based on this sample (men, manufacturing sector). First, because the trends in collective agreements and export participation 
hold especially in the manufacturing sector, and second, in order to be comparable with other studies, like Baumgarten (2013), which used the same 
dataset. Weighting factors are taken into account. Statistical signiﬁcance: Until 1999 (Speciﬁcations B and C), all values were signiﬁcantly different 
from zero at least to the ﬁve percent level.
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manufacturing	industry	increased	during	the	period	observed	–	so	has	the	export	intensity,	i.e.,	
the	average	share	of	sales	made	abroad	(Figure	12).
Furthermore,	 exporting	companies	are	 important	employers.	Figure	13	shows	 that	about	every	
third	 employee	 works	 in	 a	 company	 that	 makes	 some	 portion	 of	 its	 revenue	 abroad.	 In	 the	
manufacturing	 sector,	 the	 employment	 share	 of	 exporting	 companies	 is	more	 than	70	percent	
(2010).
Figure 12: The importance of exporters
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample covers the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered.
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Figure 13: Share of exporting companies, share of employment
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. Weighting factors are considered
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5.4 The role of exports for wages 
In	 current	 theoretical	 works,	 economists	 (Helpman	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Egger	 and	 Kreikemeier	 2009,	
Felbermayr	 et	 al.	 2014),	 argue	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 global	 trade	 and	wage	 inequality	
runs	via	the	wage	difference	between	exporting	and	non-exporting	companies.	According	to	this,	
frictions	 in	 the	 labor	market	 result	 from	more	productive	exporters	paying	higher	wages	 than	
less	productive	non-exporters.	An	exporter	wage	premium	was	reported	in	numerous	empirical	
studies	across	various	economies.	For	example,	Bernard	and	Jensen	(1995,	1999,	2004)	found	in	
various	studies	of	US	businesses	that	exporting	companies	pay	between	four	and	nine	percent	
higher	wages	than	exclusively	domestic	companies.	
Greenaway	and	Yu	(2004)	show	evidence	from	companies	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	identify	
an	exporter	wage	premium	of	4.5	to	6.4	percent.	Studies	of	companies	in	Taiwan	find	premiums	
in	the	range	of	14	to	30	percent	(Aw	and	Batry	1999,	Liu	et	al.	1999,	Tsou	et	al.	2002).	Schank	et	
al.	(2007)	provide	a	comprehensive	overview	of	studies	that	use	company	data	to	calculate	the	
exporter	wage	premium.	Studies	based	on	company	data,	however,	are	subject	to	the	restriction	
that	 they	 cannot	 differentiate	whether	 higher	wages	 at	 exporters	 reflect	 a	 higher	 quality	 of	
workers	or	comparable	workers	earn	more	if	they	are	hired	by	an	exporting	company.	To	make	
this	 determination,	 there	 must	 be	 data	 about	 the	 companies	 and	 their	 employees:	 Munch	
and	 Skaksen	 (2008)	 consider	 linked	 employer-employee	 data	 for	 Denmark	 and	 come	 to	 the	
conclusion	that	a	ten	percent	increase	in	export	intensity	leads	to	0.5	percent	higher	wages.21	
Schank	et	al.	(2007)	find	similar	results	based	on	the	LIAB	dataset	for	Germany:	A	ten	percent	rise	
in	export	intensity	leads	to	0.2	to	0.8	percent	higher	wages.22	
Analogous	to	our	analyses	of	the	significance	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	for	wages,	we	
examine	below	a	simple	Specification	(A),	in	which	we	regress	separately	for	each	year	the	log	
real	wages	 on	 an	 indicator	 variable	 for	 the	 export	 status	 of	 the	 company.	We	 control	 for	 both	
demographic	 characteristics	 (age	 group,	 educational	 group,	 their	 interaction)	 as	 well	 as	 for	
the	 corresponding	 industrial	 sector	 and	 region.	 Figure	 14	 shows	 the	 trend	 for	 exporter	 wage	
premiums.	From	1999	to	2007,	the	premium	rose	almost	continuously,	from	eleven	to	16	percent,	
before	it	dropped	in	2008	and	then	reached	15	percent	again	in	2010.	
If	we	additionally	control	 for	 the	size	of	 the	company	 (in	 terms	of	 revenue	 (Specification	B)	or	
employment	(Specification	C)),	the	wage	premium	shrinks	noticeably	to	values	between	zero	and	
three	percent	(B),	or	two	and	four	percent	(C).	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	exporting	companies	are	
on	average	larger,	and	size	itself	is	already	linked	with	higher	wages;	thus	only	a	small	exporter	
wage	premium	above	and	beyond	the	size	premium	can	be	identified.	This	finding	is	consistent	
with	trade	theoretical	 literature	based	on	the	model	by	Melitz	(2003).	 It	suggests	that	 it	 is	 the	
productive	companies	that	can	afford	to	enter	export	markets.	The	prospect	of	big	sales	markets	
21	 	There	is	only	very	limited	comparability	of	the	calculated	exporter	wage	premiums	across	different	studies	and	countries.	The	
reason	 is	 the	use	of	different	databases	 (especially	company	data	vs.	personal	data),	 the	application	of	different	econometric	
procedures	and	the	examination	of	different	time	periods.
22	 Additional	studies	about	Germany	include	Bernard	and	Wagner	(1997),	Arnold	and	Hussinger	(2005)	and	Klein	et	al.	(2013).
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lets	companies	grow	and	makes	paying	higher	wages	seem	profitable.	The	fact	that	international	
trade	 changes	 the	 size	 distribution	 of	 companies	 is	 why	 the	 effect	 between	 trade	 and	 wage	
premium	occurs	mainly	through	company	size.
A	more	 extensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 exporter	 wage	 premium	 shows	 that	 the	 premiums	 are	 also	
different,	 depending	 on	 which	 target	 market	 a	 company	 exports	 to.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 wage	
premiums	by	companies	that	export	exclusively	to	the	European	Currency	Union	are	generally	
lower	than	the	premiums	of	companies	that	export	only	to	the	rest	of	the	world	(Figure	15,	here	
only	Specification	A).23	The	highest	premiums,	however,	are	paid	by	those	companies	that	earn	a	
portion	of	their	revenue	both	within	the	currency	union	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	For	the	years	
2004	to	2007,	there	is	also	information	about	the	newly	joining	Eastern	European	countries.	This	
gives	a	more	conclusive	picture:	Companies	that	export	exclusively	to	these	(nearby)	markets	pay	
a	relatively	small	exporter	wage	premium.24
23	 	In	the	LIAB	dataset	there	is	information	about	export	destinations	for	1998	to	2007.	The	exact	question	reads	“What	percentage	of	
your	revenue	was	earned	in	countries	of	the	European	Currency	Union/other	foreign	markets/the	new	EU	countries.”	Questions	
about	the	new	EU	countries	were	asked	only	from	2004	to	2007.
24	 For	an	extensive	discussion	of	the	exporter	wage	premium	in	terms	of	different	destination	markets,	see	Schmillen	2011.
Figure 14: Trend for the exporter wage premium
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes male full-time employees in companies in the manufacturing sector. The 
values of the exporter wage premium result from year-speciﬁc regressions in which the log real wages are regressed on individual characteristics, 
indicator variables of the industrial sector and the federal states (Speciﬁcation A), revenue (Speciﬁcation B) and employment (Speciﬁcation C). 
Weighting factors are considered. Statistical signiﬁcance: Except for the values from 1997 to 2002 and 2009 of Speciﬁcation B, all values are 
signiﬁcantly different from zero to at least the ﬁve percent level.
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5.5 The role of imports for wages 
Aside	 from	 the	steep	 rise	 in	exports,	German	companies	have	also	significantly	 increased	 their	
imports.	Over	the	period	between	2000	and	2010,	Germany’s	imports	grew	by	nearly	50	percent	
(Federal	 Statistical	 Office,	 2014).	 Just	 how	 strongly	 companies’	 import	 behavior	 affects	 wages	
cannot	 be	 clearly	 derived	 from	 economic	 theory.	 A	 potential	 decrease	 in	wages	 due	 to	 greater	
opportunities	 for	substitution	for	domestic	workers	 is	 just	 is	conceivable	as	wage	growth	due	to	
increased	productivity.
We	analyze	below	the	role	of	import	activity	in	German	companies	on	their	wages	and	distinguish	
between	exclusively	importing	companies,	exclusively	exporting	companies,	companies	that	both	
import	 and	 export	 and	 companies	 that	 are	 exclusively	 active	 on	 the	 domestic	market	 (see	 also	
Baumgarten	2013).	Companies	that	both	import	as	well	as	export	have	been	demonstrated	to	pay	
the	highest	wages.	
Figure 15: Trend of the exporter wage premium by destination market
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes male full-time employees from companies in the manufacturing sector. The 
values of the exporter wage premium result from year-speciﬁc regressions in which the log real are is regressed on individual characteristics as well 
as on indicator variables of the industrial sector and the federal state. Weighting factors are considered. Statistical signiﬁcance: except for the value 
for “new EU members” in 2004, all values are signiﬁcantly different from zero at least to the ﬁve percent level. 
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Interestingly,	 it	can	additionally	be	noted	 that	exclusively	 importing	companies	also	pay	a	wage	
premium	that	is	about	as	large	as	the	one	paid	by	exclusively	exporting	companies.	Employees	in	
importing	companies	thus	profit	from	the	trading	behavior	of	their	company.	A	possible	explanation	
for	this	could	be	that	imported	inputs	reduce	production	costs	and	thus	increase	productivity	in	
the	domestic	companies.	These	can	then	be	reflected	in	higher	wages	for	the	domestic	staff.25	What	
is	 important,	however,	 is	that	we	cannot	draw	any	conclusions	about	the	employment	effects	on	
importing	or	exporting	companies.	Table	4	shows	 the	wage	premiums	 for	 the	different	 types	of	
trade.
25	 	Kohler	 (2004)	 and	 Grossman	 and	 Rossi-Hansberg	 (2008)	 show,	 for	 example,	 the	 positive	 productivity	 effects	 for	 domestic	
companies	of	outsourcing	production	abroad.
Table 4: Wage premium by type of trade 
Year Exporter Importer Exporter and Importer
1999 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.13***
2001 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.12***
2003 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.16***
*** shows significance at the one percent level. The underlying sample consists of male full-time employees from companies 
in the manufacturing sector. Only for 1999, 2001 and 2003 does the dataset have information available on the import 
activity of companies. For those years, we regress log real wages on the trade type variable, individual characteristics and 
indicator variables for the industrial sector and federal state. Weighting factors are considered.
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB.
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6 What factors are driving the change in inequality?
In	 the	previous	analyses	presented	 in	 this	report,	we	showed	the	dynamics	of	wage	 inequality	
along	individual	dimensions	and	pointed	out	the	importance	of	selected	company	characteristics	
for	the	wage	structure.	These	factors	have	so	far	been	considered	in	isolation,	and	there	has	been	
no	analysis	of	the	quantitative	explanatory	contribution	of	the	different	factors	to	the	dynamics	of	
wage	inequality.	The	goal	of	this	section	is	thus	to	quantify	the	significance	of	individual	factors	
and	their	respective	contributions	to	the	dynamics	of	wage	inequality	in	a	comprehensive	model.	
Here	it	is	crucial	to	separate	the	possible	contribution	of	international	trade	to	the	development	
of	 wage	 inequality	 from	 the	 traditional	 influencing	 factors,	 such	 as	 institutional	 changes	 and	
technological	change.
Various	aspects	are	of	central	importance	to	this	analysis.	First,	it	is	key	to	have	a	model	available	
that	allows	considering	several	factors	at	the	same	time,	in	order	to	measure	the	contribution	of	
one	factor	as	distinct	from	others.	So,	for	example,	a	univariate	analysis	might	suggest	that	the	
decline	 of	 collective	bargaining	 agreements	has	made	an	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	 rise	 in	
wage	inequality.	To	the	extent	that	the	decline	in	collective	agreements	could	be	at	least	partially	
due	to	structural	economic	changes,	where	industries	with	(traditionally)	low	collective	bargaining	
coverage	 have	 become	 relatively	more	 important,	 this	 univariate	 “collective	 bargaining	 effect”	
would	partially	 include	a	 “sector	effect”	and	would	 thus	possibly	be	overestimated.	 In	order	 to	
distinguish	these	two	potential	influences	from	each	other,	it	is	therefore	important	to	integrate	
the	 industrial	sector	as	well	as	 the	 form	of	wage	negotiation	 in	 the	analysis.	The	same	applies	
analogously	to	other	explanatory	factors.	
In	addition,	it	is	crucial	to	be	able	to	distinguish	the	“wage	structure	effect”	from	the	“composition	
effect.”	 The	 wage	 structure	 effect	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 “price	 effect,”	 and	 the	 composition	
effect	 as	 a	 “quantity	 effect.”	These	are	based	on	 the	 consideration	 that	 individual	 explanatory	
factors	can	have	an	influence	on	the	dynamic	of	wage	inequality	through	two	different	channels.	
A	possible	positive	contribution	by	education	to	 the	rise	 in	wage	 inequality	may	be	due	to	 the	
fact	that	the	share	of	highly	skilled	employees	(with	a	possible	constant	return	on	education)	has	
increased	over	time	(composition	effect).	This	is	the	case,	for	example,	when	wage	dispersion	is	
comparatively	high	within	 the	group	of	highly	skilled	workers.	At	 the	same	 time	 it	 is	possible	
that	the	return	on	education	(with	possible	constant	shares	of	employees	from	the	individual	skill	
groups)	has	increased	(wage	structure	effect)	or	the	wage	inequality	within	the	education	group	
has	increased	(likewise	wage	structure	effect).	Among	the	individual	explanatory	factors,	the	two	
channels	ought	to	be	of	different	importance.	Both	channels	could	work	in	different	directions	on	
the	individual	explanatory	factors.	
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Finally,	 it	 is	 likewise	 of	 great	 interest	 to	 quantify	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 individual	 explanatory	
factors	 at	 different	 parts	 of	 the	wage	 distribution.	 A	 decline	 in	 collective	 bargaining	 coverage	
may,	 for	example,	have	a	different	 influence	on	the	lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution	than	on	
the	upper	tail.	In	the	following	section,	we	provide	a	quick	sketch	of	a	model	that	satisfies	these	
requirements.
6.1 Methodological aspects 
In	order	 to	determine	 the	explanatory	contribution	of	different	 factors	 to	 the	dynamic	of	wage	
inequality,	 we	 apply	 a	 decomposition	 analysis	 suggested	 by	 Firpo	 et	 al.	 (2009),	 based	 on	 RIF	
(recentered	influence	functions)	regressions.	Using	this	technique,	first,	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	
can	be	broken	down	into	a	 total	composition	effect	and	a	total	wage	structure	effect.	Then,	 the	
various	contributions	of	the	individual	explanatory	factors	to	both	components	can	be	identified.26	
The	decomposition	is	applicable	to	very	different	measurements	of	inequality.	Here	it	is	applied	
to	the	85-15	wage	differential27	(as	the	inequality	measure	for	the	total	wage	distribution),	the	85-
50-wage	differential	(as	the	inequality	measure	of	the	upper	tail	of	the	wage	distribution)	and	the	
50-15	wage	differential	(as	the	inequality	measure	for	the	lower	tail	of	the	wage	distribution).28
The	decomposition	analysis	provides	valuable	clues	 to	 the	meaning	of	 the	various	explanatory	
factors	but	 is	 also	 subject	 to	 some	 limitations	 that	must	be	 considered	 in	 interpretation.	 First,	
it	is	important	to	emphasize	that	the	applied	method	completely	ascribes	the	changing	of	wage	
inequality	over	the	time	period	to	the	factors	considered.	As	a	model,	therefore,	it	is	assumed	that	
the	total	of	all	composition	and	wage	structure	effects	reflects	the	total	change	in	wage	inequality	
over	time.29	
In	 addition,	 the	 identified	 wage	 structure	 effects	 reflect	 both	 the	 changed	 wage	 differentials	
between	 different	 groups	 (explained	 inequality)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 changed	wage	 inequality	 within	
groups	(residual	wage	inequality).	A	sharp	distinction	between	explained	and	residual	inequality,	
as	 we	 have	 so	 far	 examined	 them	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 study,	 is	 thus	 not	 possible	 using	
this	method.	 Through	 this	 decomposition	 analysis,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 becomes	 clear	which	
groups	have	experienced	a	shift	in	the	underlying	compositional	structure	that	affects	the	wage	
distribution	 (composition	 effect)	 and	 which	 groups	 have	 seen	 a	 change	 in	 the	 compensation	
structure	(wage	structure	effect).
26	 	Since	decomposition	analysis	is	a	statistical	procedure	and	includes	a	certain	lack	of	clarity,	it	is	accompanied	by	an	additional	
error	term	(reweighting	error	and	specification	error).
27	 This	refers	to	the	difference	between	the	85	percent	percentile	and	the	15	percent	percentile.
28	 	We	select	here	the	85-15	differential	(insead	of	the	80-20	differential,	as	earlier	in	the	report),	in	order	to	obtain	a	more	accurate	
impression	of	the	extent	of	the	inequality.	Moreover,	in	this	way,	the	results	are	more	comparable	with	other	studies	based	on	the	
same	data	(Dustmann	et	al.	2009,	Baumgarten	2013).
29	
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Since	 changes	 in	 quantities	 (composition)	 are	 contemplated	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	 changes	 in	
prices	(wage	structure),	general	equilibrium	effects	are	also	ignored	in	this	analysis.	This	means,	
for	 example,	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 staff	 share	 of	 highly	 skilled	 workers	 is	 viewed	 as	 entirely	
independent	from	the	change	in	the	return	on	education.	In	addition,	the	wage	structure	effect	of	
the	individual	explanatory	factors	determined	depends	on	the	choice	of	basic	categories	used.	We	
proceed	with	the	greatest	possible	neutrality	and	define	the	categoric	variables	of	the	individual	
modal	category	from	1996	as	the	baseline	category.30	An	additional	limitation	is	that	no	causal	
effects	can	be	identified	by	decomposition	analysis.	
In	 our	 analysis	we	 consider	 the	 following	 individual	 and	 company-specific	 explanatory	 factors	
to	provide	the	most	precise	picture	of	the	drivers	of	wage	inequality.	At	the	individual	level,	we	
differentiate	between	 three	education	groups,	 five	age	 categories	 and	more	 than	300	different	
occupational	 groups.	 At	 the	 company	 level,	 we	 look	 at	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 by	
checking	for	three	different	forms	of	wage	setting	(industry	collective	agreement,	company-level	
agreement	 or	 no	 collective	 agreement),	 recording	 the	 international	 engagement	 of	 companies	
by	checking	the	export	status	of	individual	businesses	and	taking	into	account	potential	effects	
of	 technological	 progress	 by	 checking	whether	 a	 company	has	 invested	 in	new	 technologies.31	
Furthermore,	we	also	capture	any	possible	structural	business	change	by	checking	for	additional	
industry	branches.
We	first	conducted	the	decomposition	analysis	for	the	entire	period	from	1996	to	2010	for	full-time	
male	employees	in	the	manufacturing	sector.	The	manufacturing	sector	 is	of	special	 interest	 in	
this	respect	because	two	of	the	explanatory	factors	considered,	(decline	of)	collective	bargaining	
and	international	trade,	are	of	outstanding	importance	to	this	sector.	The	limitation	to	men,	like	
the	 choice	 of	 the	 wage	 inequality	 standard	 used,	 serves	 to	 increase	 comparability	 with	 other	
studies	that	had	also	applied	this	restriction	(see	Baumgarten	2013).	We	subsequently	performed	
the	decomposition	analysis	separately	for	the	two	subperiods	–	1996	to	2003	and	2003	to	2010	–	
to	gain	a	better	insight	into	the	dynamics	of	wage	inequality	and	its	driving	factors.
6.2 Results
Figure	 16	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 decomposition	 analysis	 in	 a	 graph.32	 For	 all	 explanatory	
factors	considered,	the	contributions	to	the	composition	effect	(upper	part	of	the	figure)	and	the	
wage	structure	effect	(lower	part	of	the	figure).	The	three	columns	next	to	each	other	depict	the	
results	of	the	different	inequality	standards.	They	are	shown	as	increases	in	log	percentage	points.	
It	 becomes	 clear	 that	 wage	 inequality	 has	 risen	 by	 about	 13	 log	 percentage	 points	 over	 the	
observation	period.	A	majority	of	that	rise	can	be	traced	back	to	an	increase	in	the	lower	wage	
30	 With	binary	variables,	the	base	group	is	“naturally”	occurring.
31	 Investments	in	new	technologies	refer	to	investments	in	communication	and	data	processing.
32	 A	comprehensive	table	of	the	results,	which	also	includes	standard	errors,	can	be	found	in	Table	A1	in	the	Appendix.
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distribution	 range.	 Furthermore,	 we	 recognize	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 inequality	 is	 connected	
primarily	 to	 composition	 effects,	 meaning	 shifts	 in	 the	 underlying	 employer	 structure:	 They	
explain	around	80	percent	of	the	total	increase.	By	contrast,	the	aggregated	wage	structure	effect	
is	of	lesser	significance.33	
When	we	consider	the	individual	composition	effects	in	detail,	we	see	that	the	decline	in	collective	
bargaining	agreements	has	primarily	promoted	inequality	and	is	associated	with	an	increase	of	
around	6	log	percentage	points.	If	we	compare	the	effects	across	the	ranges	of	wage	distribution,	it	
reveals	that	the	decline	in	collective	bargaining	agreements	promoted	inequality	especially	in	the	
lower	range	of	wage	distribution	(increase	of	around	5	log	percentage	points).	This	illustrates	that	
the	binding	force	of	collective	wages	is	strongest	in	the	lower	range	of	wage	distribution	so	that	a	
decline	in	these	types	of	agreements	chiefly	impacts	wage	distribution	in	this	range.	In	addition,	
changes	in	the	workers’	education	and	age	structures	promote	inequality	and	are	associated	with	
an	increase	in	wage	inequality	of	1.33	log	percentage	points	(education)	and	2.75	log	percentage	
points	(age).	Their	effects	are	greatest	in	the	upper	range	of	wage	distribution.	These	results	reflect	
the	development	that	a	shift	to	higher	education	and	age	groups	occurred	during	the	time	period	
being	studied.	 In	particular,	 the	share	of	highly-qualified	workers	and	 those	 in	 the	46–55	and	
56–65	age	groups	increased.	Wage	distribution	within	these	specific	groups	is	traditionally	high.	
We	were	unable	to	identify	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	composition	effects	for	our	export	
and	technology	variables.	This	also	applies	to	the	explanatory	factors,	sector	and	occupation.
Looking	at	the	wage	structure	effects	in	detail,	these	show	very	different	directions	of	effect	for	
the	individual	factors.	An	overall	effect	that	 is	not	statistically	different	from	zero	is	the	result.	
Regarding	the	interpretation	of	the	wage	structure	effects	of	the	individual	factors,	we	reiterate	
that	these	depend	on	the	choice	of	the	base	category.	Therefore,	the	specific	factor’s	contribution	
to	a	change	in	the	wage	structure	is	reflected	relative	to	its	base	category.	Moreover,	direct	changes	
in	the	return	for	individual	factors	are	reflected	in	the	wage	structure	effects	as	well	as	changes	in	
the	residual	inequality	within	the	group	being	studied	relative	to	the	base	group.34	Nevertheless,	
interesting	 overall	 conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 derived	 results	 on	 the	 development	 of	
the	 relative	wage	 structure	 of	 the	 individual	 explanatory	 factors	 and	 their	 significance	 for	 the	
increase	in	wage	inequality.	For	example,	it	becomes	clear	that	changes	in	the	wage	structure	for	
employment	relationships	covered	by	collective	bargaining	agreements	during	the	study	period	
had	a	negative	 effect	 on	 equality	 and	 can	be	 associated	with	 a	 rise	 in	 inequality	 of	 almost	11	
log	percentage	points.	This	encompasses	an	increase	in	both	the	collective	bargaining	premium	
as	 well	 as	 the	 residual	 inequality	 within	 such	 employment	 relationships	 relative	 to	 those	 in	
employment	relationships	not	covered	by	these	agreements.35	It	is	also	evident	that	workers	at	
the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution	are	especially	affected	here.	Further,	the	education-wage	
33	 	The	difference	between	the	total	change	and	the	sum	of	composition	and	wage	structure	effects	is	the	result	of	the	specification	
and	weighting	errors.	These	are	presented	in	the	table	in	the	Appendix.
34	 In	 our	 analysis,	 the	 base	 category	 is	 defined	 through	 the	 following	 categories:	 education	 –	 average	 qualification	 levels;	 age	
group	 –	 26–35;	 occupation	 –	metalworkers,	 non-exporting	 company,	 no	 collective	 bargaining	 agreement,	 no	 investment	 in	 new	
technologies;	industry	–	metalworking.	The	wage	structure	effect	of	the	constants	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	change	in	the	residual	
wage	inequality	for	the	base	category.
35	 See	also	Dustmann	et	al.	(2014).
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structure	effect	that	promotes	inequality	indicates	a	change	in	the	return	on	education	or	a	change	
in	the	wage	dispersion	within	the	education	groups,	which	particularly	impacts	the	upper	range	of	
wage	distribution.	Additionally,	our	findings	reveal	that	the	wage	spread	in	most	age	groups	has	
dropped	relative	to	the	base	group	(workers	from	age	26	to	35).36	This	results	in	an	overall	effect	
associated	with	the	age	factor	that	reduces	inequality.	
Thus	 far	our	decomposition	analysis	has	underscored	 the	significance	of	 traditional	 factors	 for	
increasing	wage	inequality:	Changes	in	collective	bargaining	agreements	and	the	corresponding	
wage	 structure,	 as	 well	 as	 changes	 in	 the	 education	 and	 age	 structure	 for	 workers	 and	 their	
individual	 wages	 all	 influence	 the	 development	 of	 wage	 inequality.	 We	 could	 not	 identify	 a	
statistically	significant	influence	on	the	increase	in	wage	inequality	for	either	our	export	channel	
36	 In	fact,	our	data	confirms	that	the	wage	dispersion	within	the	base	group	increased	the	most.
Figure 16: Decomposition results in detail, 1996–2010
Source: LIAB. The sample includes men between the ages of 18 and 65 employed full-time in the ma-nufacturing industry. Weighting factors are 
considered. ***, **, * statistically signiﬁcant at the one, ﬁve or ten percent level. Increases are shown in log percentage points.
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or	the	technological	change	factor.	However,	it	is	conceivable	that	the	relatively	long	period	of	time	
under	consideration	 (from	1996	to	2010)	might	conceal	new	and	potentially	 interesting	trends.	
For	 that	 reason,	we	conducted	a	decomposition	analyses	 for	 two	 time	segments.	We	separated	
the	entire	 time	period	 into	 two	equally	 long	sub-periods	and	analyzed	 the	years	1996	 to	2003	
and	2003	to	2010.	Fundamental	labor	market	reforms	were	introduced	between	2003	and	2006	
as	part	of	the	Hartz	legislation,	and	therefore	fall	into	the	second	time	period.	However,	it	is	not	
clear	a	priori	how	this	could	affect	the	significance	of	the	individual	factors	for	the	development	
of	wage	inequality.	
Figure	17	illustrates	the	results	of	the	decomposition	analysis	for	both	time	periods.	We	compare	
the	development	of	the	composition	and	wage	structure	effects	of	both	time	periods	and	concentrate	
on	the	results	of	the	85-15	wage	differential.37	
It	becomes	clear	that	wage	inequality	increased	more	sharply	during	the	second	period	of	time.	
However,	 it	 is	plausible	that	this	 increase	could	be	due	at	 least	 in	part	to	the	expansion	of	 the	
low-wage	sector	in	Germany	and	therefore	linked	to	the	above-mentioned	Hartz	reforms	(see	also	
Section	3).	A	comparison	of	the	detailed	composition	and	wage	structure	effects	further	shows	that	
the	decisive	differences	between	the	two	time	periods	can	be	traced	back	to	changes	in	the	wage	
structure	 (and	not	 to	 changed	composition	effects).	While	 changes	 in	 the	 collective	bargaining	
premium	or	the	associated	wage	structure	only	promoted	inequality	during	the	first	subperiod,	
no	 influence	could	be	 identified	 in	 the	second	subperiod.	By	contrast,	 the	results	 indicate	 that	
a	change	 in	 the	exporter	wage	premium	had	an	 inequality-promoting	effect	during	 the	second	
time	period,	but	not	 in	 the	 first.	Therefore,	 these	 results	point	 toward	 the	growing	 importance	
of	companies’	export	status	 for	 the	development	of	wage	 inequality	 in	Germany.	One	potential	
approach	 for	explaining	 this	change	 is	 that	wage	 flexibility	has	 increased	sharply	 in	Germany	
due	to	the	documented	decline	of	(industry)	collective	bargaining	agreements.	As	such,	company	
characteristics	relevant	to	business	success,	such	as	export	status,	have	a	stronger	effect	on	paid	
wages.	 This	 greater	 company	wage	 differentiation,	which	was	 also	 documented	 by	 Card	 et	 al.	
(2014),	impacts	the	development	of	total	wage	inequality	accordingly.
37	 	A	detailed	representation	of	the	results	in	table	form	that	also	contains	the	statistical	standard	error	can	be	found	in	Table	A2	in	
the	Appendix.
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Figure 17: Detailed results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2003, 
2003–2010 
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are employed in the manufacturing 
sector. Weighting factors are considered. ***, **, * statistically signiﬁcant at the one, ﬁve or ten percent level. Increases are shown in log percentage 
points.
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6.3 Assessment and summary
The	results	of	our	decomposition	analysis	show	that	the	majority	of	the	increase	in	wage	inequality	
can	be	traced	back	to	composition	effects.	According	to	the	analysis,	changes	in	the	underlying	
structure	for	workers	can	be	linked	to	around	80	percent	of	the	increase	in	inequality	between	
1996	and	2010.	The	decline	of	 collective	bargaining	agreements	plays	 the	most	 important	 role	
here.	 It	 particularly	 increases	 inequality	 in	 the	 lower	 range	 of	wage	 distribution	 and	 explains	
around	43	percent	of	the	entire	increase	during	the	period	of	time	in	question.	It	is	accompanied	
by	 a	 change	 in	 the	wage	 structure	 that	 also	 promotes	 inequality	 in	 the	 lower	 segment	 of	 the	
distribution.38	However,	our	observations	of	the	different	time	periods	show	that	these	changes	
provided	an	explanatory	contribution	to	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	exclusively	in	the	period	from	
1996	to	2003.	Aside	from	changes	in	the	collective	bargaining	structure,	the	shift	in	the	workers’	
structure	 toward	 higher	 education	 and	 age	 groups	 played	 an	 important	 role	 for	 rising	 wage	
inequality.	This	can	be	traced	back	to	the	fact	that	highly-qualified	and	older	workers	traditionally	
exhibit	a	higher	wage	dispersion	than	other	skill	groups.	The	shift	to	higher	education	and	age	
groups	explains	around	10	and	20	percent	respectively	of	the	total	rise	in	wage	inequality	from	
1996	to	2010.	Furthermore,	 the	results	of	our	decomposition	analysis	revealed	a	change	 in	 the	
return	for	highly-qualified	workers	or	the	residual	inequality	within	this	group.	This	development	
promotes	inequality	in	the	upper	portion	of	the	wage	distribution,	comprising	a	total	of	around	34	
percent	of	the	observed	total	rise	in	inequality.
Investments	 in	 new	 technologies,	 our	 measure	 for	 technological	 change,	 had	 no	 immediate	
influence	on	the	growth	of	 inequality	according	to	our	analysis.	Company	export	behavior	also	
plays	a	subordinate	role.	Changes	in	the	exporter	wage	premium	only	had	an	inequality-promoting	
influence	during	the	more	recent	time	period	of	2003	to	2010.
Therefore,	our	analysis	confirmed	the	overall	significance	of	traditional	factors	as	drivers	of	wage	
inequality.	By	contrast,	international	trade	had	a	very	moderate	direct	effect	on	the	development	
of	 wage	 inequality	 within	 the	 export	 channel	 considered	 in	 this	 analysis.	 Table	 5	 provides	 a	
summary	of	the	results.
38	 	These	changes	in	the	wage	structure	are	connected	to	around	80	percent	of	the	total	increase.	It	becomes	clear	that	changes	
which	 are	 solely	 associated	with	 the	 collective	 bargaining	 structure	 in	Germany	–	 viewed	 in	 isolation	–	would	have	had	 an	
even	stronger	effect	than	those	actually	observed.	When	considering	the	individual	percentages	overall,	we	must	first	take	into	
account	that	some	explanatory	factors	have	an	inequality-reducing	effect	(such	as	the	wage	structure	effect	of	age)	and	therefore	
that	percentages	exceeding	100	percent	are	mathematically	possible.	Second,	we	must	also	take	into	account	that	constants	as	
well	as	weighting	and	specification	errors	must	be	included	in	the	calculation	(please	see	the	detailed	table	in	the	Appendix).
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In	the	next	section	we	will	conduct	a	supplementary	analysis	in	which	we	consider	the	correlation	
between	 international	 trade	 and	 inequality	 at	 an	 aggregated	 level.	 We	 will	 measure	 sectoral	
openness	using	data	 that	 assesses	added	value	and	 therefore	are	also	 taking	 into	account	 the	
interdependence	 structures	 within	 the	 national	 economy.	 Unlike	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 section,	
an	 examination	 at	 the	 aggregated	 sectoral	 level	 also	 considers	 possible	 indirect	 effects	 from	
international	 trade	 that	 arise	 from	 the	 exporter	wage	 premium	 and	 the	 share	 of	 employment	
by	export	companies.	For	example,	it	is	conceivable	that	supplier	companies	that	do	not	export	
themselves	may	also	benefit	from	increasing	export	opportunities,	and	this	trickles	down	to	the	
wages	of	their	employees.	Moreover,	this	analysis	enables	us	to	consider	both	the	export	channel	
as	well	as	the	import	channel	and	thereby	examine	the	flipside	of	increased	trade	integration	and	
greater	import	competition.
Table 5: Central results of the decomposition analysis
Composition effect The share of jobs not covered by collective bargaining is increasing, which increases inequality. This 
affects the lower range of wage distribution.
The share of highly skilled and older employees is rising. Since the wage differential within both of 
these groups is high, this increases inequality. This affects the upper range of the wage distribution.
Wage structure 
effect
The wage structure effect related to collective bargaining promotes inequality. However, this only 
occurs during the first subperiod (1996-2003). This affects the lower range of wage distribution.
The return on education for the highly-skilled relative to the medium-skilled has increased. 
Moreover, the wage gap within the highly-skilled group has increased. Both of these increase 
inequality. This affects the upper range of the wage distribution.
The exporter wage structure effect promotes inequality in the second subperiod (2003-2010).
Source: Own representation.
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7  International trade und inequality on a sectoral level
We	will	now	examine	the	connection	between	international	trade	and	inequality	at	the	sectoral	
level	using	openness	as	a	measure	of	an	industry’s	import	and	export	activities.	To	perform	this	
analysis,	we	are	using	the	standard	deviation	of	log	gross	wages	as	the	measure	of	inequality.	
We	will	measure	 the	 different	 sectors’	 openness	 by	 the	 share	 of	 the	 exported	 value	 added	 of	
each	 sector’s	 total	 value	 added.	 This	 has	 a	 decisive	 advantage	 compared	 to	 other	measures	 of	
openness	because	it	allows	indirect	exports	to	also	be	taken	into	consideration.	These	are	created	
when	 sectors	 that	 export	 little	 or	 nothing	 themselves	 deliver	 inputs	 to	 other,	 more	 export-
oriented	 sectors.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 measure	 used,	 imported	 inputs	 are	 deducted	 because	 they	
do	not	create	any	domestic	value.	The	measure	 is	 the	share	of	 the	sector’s	value	added	that	 is	
absorbed	(consumed	or	invested)	abroad.	In	addition,	we	are	working	with	an	analogous	measure	
of	import	openness,	which	expresses	the	foreign	value	added	absorbed	domestically	as	a	share	of	
the	domestic	sectoral	demand.39
The	 measures	 of	 openness	 were	 calculated	 based	 on	 the	 World	 Input	 Output	 Data	 (WIOD)40	
and	compiled	for	our	analysis	with	the	aggregated	 inequality	measures	 from	the	SIAB	dataset.	
This	correlation	yielded	information	for	a	total	of	34	sectors	(15	manufacturing,	17	services,	one	
agricultural	and	one	mining),	over	a	period	of	time	from	1998	to	2010,	providing	us	in	the	end	with	
432	observations.	Figure	18	shows	the	data.	
We	 consider	 a	 simple	 regression	 model	 for	 our	 analysis.	 The	 central	 challenge	 consisted	 of	
distinguishing	 the	 influence	 of	 openness	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 other	 sectoral	 characteristics.	
As	a	 result,	 besides	 the	variables	of	 interest,	 our	 regression	model	 takes	 the	 following	control	
variables	 into	 account:	 a	 complete	 set	 of	 industry	 indicators	 (to	 isolate	 constant	 heterogeneity	
between	sectors),	a	complete	set	of	annual	 indicators	 (to	 represent	 the	macroeconomic	 trends)	
as	well	as	linear	and	quadratic	sector-specific	time	trends.	This	design	is	intended	to	help	ensure	
that	the	correlations	between	openness	and	inequality	are	not	driven	by	factors	other	than	the	
two	 variables	 of	 interest.	 Unfortunately,	 no	 aggregated	 data	 is	 available	 on	 the	 development	
of	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 at	 the	 sectoral	 level,	 so	 we	 cannot	 examine	 it	 directly	 in	
our	analysis.41	However,	we	can	assume	that	 the	majority	of	change	 in	collective	bargaining	 is	
captured	by	taking	into	account	the	annual	indicators	as	well	as	time	trends.
39	 	The	methodology	used	as	well	as	the	underlying	data	are	presented	in	Aichele	et	al.	(2013).	Additionally,	all	measures	of	openness	
were	calculated	within	the	context	of	Aichele	and	Heiland	(2014)	and	made	available	to	us.
40	 For	details,	please	see	http://www.wiod.org/new_site/home.htm
41	 	The	information	on	collective	bargaining	agreements	available	from	LIAB	data	can	only	be	aggregated	in	a	different,	very	rough	
industry	classification	that	is	not	helpful	in	this	case.
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Figure 18: Inequality and openness over time at the sector level
Source: Own calculations based on the SIAB and WIOD.
Year  Inequality (standard deviation of log of wages), left axis Export share, %, right axis
Farming & Fishing Mining
Food and Tobacco
Ofﬁce Equipment, etc.
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
2010200620021998
Construction
2010200620021998
Textiles & Clothing
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
Chemicals Retail Energy & Water
HealthcareEducation Automaking Hospitality
Wood
Glass, etc. Wholesale Real Estate
Coking
Metal
Machinery construction
Furniture & Recycling
Auto sales
Aviation
Transportation
Telecommunications
Banking & Insurance 
LeatherTransportation
Paper & Printing
Shipping
Other Services Public Administration
Leasing, etc.
Rubber & Plastics
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
25
50
75
100
20102006200219982010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
25
50
75
100 Exportanteil
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8 Ungleichh it
2010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
2010200620021998
0
25
50
75
100
20102006200219982010200620021998
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
2010200620021998
0
25
50
75
100
2010200620021998
43
International trade und inequality on a sectoral level
Table	6	shows	the	results	of	our	regression	analysis.	Because	in	most	specifications,	the	calculated	
R2	(the	share	of	the	variance	of	inequality	explained	by	our	model)	is	about	95	percent.	This	shows	
that	our	specification	allows	little	room	for	distortions	that	could	be	caused	by	the	non-modelled	
determinants	of	inequality.	Nevertheless,	the	effects	shown	in	the	table	should	not	be	interpreted	
as	causal,	because	it	is	conceivable	that	a	random	increase	in	inequality	leads	to	an	increase	in	
the	export	quota	(reverse	causality).	
Table 6: Inequality and openness at the sector level 
All sectors only PG only DL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export openness 0.067** 0.089* 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.085** 0.001
(0.030) (0.050) (0.017) (0.036) (0.034) (0.102)
Export Openness, 2 –0.02 –0.029
(0.03) (0.031)
Import Openness –0.050 –0.138
(0.064) (0.194)
Import Openness, 2 0.082
(0.127)
R2 0.9489 0.9489 0.9495 0.9499 0.9547 0.9512
Root MSE 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0061 0.0051 0.0068
F-Test
(P-Wert)
0.0264 0.0298 0.1563 0.1055 0.0399 0.0000
Number of 
industries 
34 34 34 34 15 17
Quelle: All regressions consider sector dummies, year dummies and linear and quadratic sector-specific time trends. Standard 
errors are adapted to the industry level. Columns (1)-(8): Number of years 13. PG: manufacturing industries, DL: services. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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Column	 1	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 the	 basic	 specification.	 Here,	 besides	 the	 control	 variables	
mentioned,	 a	 regression	 is	 conducted	 of	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 log	 real	 wages	 on	 export	
openness.	 In	so	doing,	we	consider	all	 sectors.	The	effect	of	0.067	 is	statistically	significant	at	
the	 five	 percent	 level.	 This	 suggests	 that	 on	 average	 across	 all	 sectors	 considered	 from	 1998	
to	2010,	 the	wage	dispersion	 increased	 from	0.42	to	0.48	by	0.06	 log	points.	The	export	share	
rose	by	13	percentage	points	from	31	to	44	percent.	The	model	suggests	that	the	rise	in	export	
openness	enabled	inequality	to	rise	by	0.00871	log	points	(0.067*0.13).	That	corresponds	to	about	
15	percent	of	the	observed	total	rise	in	inequality	(0.00871/0.06).	
An	 increase	 in	 export	 activities	 is	 therefore	 associated	 with	 an	 increase	 in	 inequality;	 the	
measured	explanatory	contribution,	however,	amounts	to	only	15	percent	of	the	measured	rise	in	
inequality.	If	average	export	openness	were	to	rise	by	another	10	percentage	points,	the	estimate	
suggests	a	rise	in	inequality	of	0.0067	log	points.	It	would	then	rise	from	just	over	0.48	to	0.49,	an	
increase	of	about	1.5	percent.	However,	this	extrapolation	is	justified	only	when	the	relationship	
between	export	openness	and	wage	inequality	is	linear.	This	must	not	necessarily	be	the	case	and	
is	examined	in	variations	of	the	basic	model,	shown	in	columns	2	to	4.	Here	the	squared	export	
share,	as	well	as	single	and	squared	import	shares,	are	considered	in	the	regression.	
The	results	demonstrate	that	the	importance	of	exports	for	inequality	is	unaffected	(it	increases	
marginally),	while	the	import	share	has	no	measurable	effect	on	the	inequality	(all	coefficients	are	
statistically	insignificant).	The	squared	export	openness	is	likewise	statistically	meaningless	but	
shows	a	negative	coefficient.	This	is	interesting	because	theoretical	studies	(Helpman	et	al.,	2010;	
Felbermayr	et	al.,	2014)	postulate	that	inequality	first	increases	with	a	rise	in	share	of	exports,	but	
then	declines	after	exceeding	a	maximum.
Columns	5	and	6	show	the	results	of	the	relevant	analyses	separated	by	the	manufacturing	sector	
(PG)	and	the	service	sector	(DL).	It	can	be	seen	that	an	increase	of	openness	is	associated	with	
higher	wage	inequality	only	in	the	manufacturing	sector.	 If	 import	openness	is	used	instead	of	
export	openness,	the	picture	remains	the	same.42	Including	squared	terms	does	not	change	the	
result,	either.
To	summarize,	our	analysis	shows	that	a	connection	can	be	established	between	openness	and	
wage	inequality	at	the	sectoral	level.	Over	the	period	of	time	from	1998	to	2010,	the	increase	in	
openness	explains	about	15	percent	of	the	measured	increase	in	wage	inequality,	and	therefore	
should	not	be	neglected.	In	keeping	with	our	results	from	Section	6,	however,	the	picture	emerges	
here	as	well	that	the	influence	of	international	trade	on	the	increase	of	wage	inequality	is	only	
moderately	significant	relative	to	the	other	factors.
42	 	The	two	openness	measures	are	highly	correlated.	The	correlation	coefficient	is	83	percent	in	the	manufacturing	sector	and	95	
percent	in	the	service	sector.
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8 Economic policy implications
Gross	wage	inequality	in	Germany	has	risen	sharply	in	recent	decades,	with	a	new	trend	emerging	
primarily	 in	the	mid-1990s.	Our	detailed	decomposition	analysis	showed	that	a	majority	of	 this	
increase	correlates	with	changes	in	collective	bargaining	in	Germany:	Around	43	percent	of	the	
total	rise	in	wage	inequality	can	be	linked	to	the	decline	in	collective	bargaining.	Workers	in	the	
lower	range	of	wage	distribution	–	where	the	binding	force	of	collective	wages	is	strongest	–	are	
especially	impacted	by	these	developments.	
The	 role	 of	 international	 trade	 on	 the	 development	 of	 wage	 inequality	 is	 significantly	 more	
moderate	by	contrast.	According	to	the	results	of	our	sectoral	analysis,	approximately	15	percent	
of	the	increase	in	wage	inequality	measured	between	1998	and	2010	can	be	linked	to	the	increased	
openness	of	a	sector.	This	contribution	should	not	be	neglected,	but	it	is	of	secondary	importance	
in	 relation	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 other	 explanatory	 factors.	We	were	 only	 able	 to	 identify	 a	 very	
limited	influence	for	companies’	international	engagement	on	the	growth	of	wage	inequality	in	
our	decomposition	analysis	as	well.	However,	the	influence	did	increase	during	the	more	recent	
time	segment.
Yet	even	if	the	determined	direct	effect	of	international	trade	on	the	inequality	trend	turns	out	to	
be	moderate,	it	is	conceivable	that	increased	international	integration	through	interdependencies	
with	 the	 changed	 institutional	 environment	 has	 an	 indirect	 relevance	 for	 the	 development	 of	
inequality.	It	is	thoroughly	plausible	that	the	decline	of	collective	forms	of	wage	bargaining	as	well	
as	the	widespread	usage	of	escape	clauses	and	other	measures	to	increase	wage	flexibility	at	the	
company	level	were	set	into	motion	with	the	process	of	growing	international	interdependence.
Our	analysis	further	shows	that	shifts	in	the	workers’	structure	toward	higher	education	and	age	
groups	are	relevant	 for	 the	rise	of	 inequality	and	can	be	associated	with	around	30	percent	of	
the	total	increase.	This	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	higher	skill	groups	traditionally	exhibit	
a	higher	wage	dispersion.	Moreover,	our	results	show	a	change	in	the	wage	structure	for	highly-
qualified	workers	that	promoted	inequality	as	well.
However,	the	results	of	our	variance	analysis	also	show	the	majority	of	the	rise	in	wage	inequality	
occurred	within	skill	groups	rather	than	between	those	groups.	This	could	indicate	that	aside	from	
other	factors,	the	“softer”	forms	of	qualification	not	visible	in	the	data	(e.g.,	real-world	occupational	
experience,	work	habits,	etc.)	have	increased	in	importance.
Further	 possible	 drivers	 for	 wage	 inequality	 include	 other	 aspects	 of	 a	 changing	 institutional	
landscape	(e.g.,	Hartz	reforms)	and	other	forms	of	globalization,	such	as	international	migration	
and	foreign	direct	investments,	which	we	have	not	examined	in	this	report.
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For	 economic	policy,	 it	 is	 important	 to	put	 our	 results	properly	 in	 context.	We	have	 examined	
wage	 inequality	 among	 dependent	 employees	 in	 Germany	 and	 found	 it	 has	 clearly	 increased.	
We	were	able	to	show	in	our	analysis	that	primarily	changes	in	collective	bargaining	agreements	
played	a	key	role	in	this	development.	However,	economic	policymakers	should	not	draw	a	hasty	
conclusion	that	strengthening	collective	bargaining	should	be	their	objective	in	order	to	reduce	
inequality.	Rather,	we	need	to	take	into	consideration	in	this	context	that	in	addition	to	the	increase	
in	wage	inequality,	we	must	also	see	an	increase	in	the	number	of	dependent	workers	during	the	
same	period	of	time.	It	is	plausible	that	both	phenomena	are	connected:	Inequality	rises	among	
employees,	especially	when	the	employees	who	earn	a	low	income	are	newly	hired.
Think	for	example	of	the	stay-at-home	parents	who	are	today	dependently	employed	and	earn	an	
income	(even	if	a	small	one)	but	were	previously	without	any	income	subject	to	social	security	
assessments	 and	 thus	were	not	 included	 in	 our	 statistics.	 If	 the	 employment	 opportunities	 for	
such	people	were	to	be	limited,	for	example	through	overly	rigid	wage	setting,	it	would	reduce	the	
measured	wage	inequality	–	but	total	income	inequality	could	actually	rise	if	they	no	longer	earn	
any	income	at	all.	
The	 central	 economic	 policy	 conclusion	 of	 our	 work	 should	 be	 that	 the	 challenge	 from	 an	
increasingly	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 gross	 wages	 should	 be	 solved	 using	 distribution	 policy	
instruments.	The	goal	is	to	achieve	a	balance	between	objectives	for	distribution	and	employment	
policy.	
Finally,	in	this	context	we	should	note	that	the	question	of	what	degree	of	inequality	should	be	
considered	desirable	in	an	economy	is	not	an	economic	but	a	social	question.	Its	answer	depends	
not	 least	 on	what	measurement	 is	used	as	 a	 standard.	For	 example,	 international	 comparative	
studies	(see	OECD	2011)	show	that	the	inequality	in	Germany	has	risen,	but	is	still	moderate	in	
an	international	comparison.43
43	 	In	the	OECD	study,	however,	inequality	is	analyzed	on	the	basis	of	diposable	income,	i.e.,	tax	and	transfer	payments	are	already	
taken	into	account.
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SIAB
The	 sample	 of	 integrated	 labor	 market	 biographies	 (SIAB)	 is	 a	 two-percent	 sample	 of	 the	
population	of	all	persons	who	were	employed	in	the	period	from	1975	to	2010	in	Germany	and	
were	obligated	to	pay	social	security	assessments,	received	benefits	in	accordance	with	the	Social	
Code	III	(recorded	starting	in	1975)	and	Social	Code	II	(recorded	starting	in	2005),	were	registered	
with	the	Federal	Employment	Agency	as	seeking	jobs	or	took	part	in	some	labor	market	policy	
measures	(recorded	starting	in	2000).	Not	included	were	persons	performing	community	service,	
members	of	the	civil	service	and	the	self-employed.	In	2010	some	695,593	persons	were	observed.	
Information	about	all	of	Germany	was	officially	available	starting	in	1991,	but	was	used	for	this	
study	only	starting	in	1992	(cf.	Riphahn	and	Schnitzlein	2011).	SIAB	makes	use	of	various	data	
sources.	A	detailed	description	can	be	found	in	Vom	Berge	et	al	(2013).
For	our	analysis,	the	employment	information	is	of	major	interest.	Every	employer	is	required	to	
report	annually,	 for	each	of	his	employees,	 the	exact	 term	of	 the	employment	 relationship	and	
the	total	compensation	paid.	Total	compensation	is	limited	to	the	amount	up	to	the	social	security	
assessment	 cutoff.	However,	 there	are	established	methods	 to	determine	wages	 in	 these	 cases	
as	well	in	sufficient	approximations,	see	Dustmann	et	al.	2009	and	Card	et	al.	2013.	In	addition	
to	 information	on	 the	 length	of	employment	and	compensation	 there	 is	additional	 information,	
such	as	a	company	identification	number,	 the	educational	 level	of	 the	employee	and	his	or	her	
occupation.	
We	concentrate	in	our	analysis	on	full-time	employees	between	18	and	65	years	old,	for	the	years	
1985	to	2010,	earning	a	daily	wage	of	at	least	ten	euros.	The	focus	on	full-time	employees	is	based	
on	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	no	 information	on	 the	number	of	hours	worked,	 since	 the	number	of	
hours	worked	by	part-time	workers	 can	vary	 substantially.	Marginal	 employment	 relationships	
and	 those	 working	 very	 little	 are	 also	 excluded	 from	 our	 analysis.	 Information	 about	 these	
employment	 relationships	 is	available	only	starting	 in	1999	and	 therefore	does	not	allow	 time-
consistent	examination.	The	selection	of	the	sample	follows	Card	et	al.	2013	and	Baumgarten	2013.
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LIAB
The	 Linked-Employer-Employee-Data	 of	 the	 IAB	 (LIAB)	 allows	 the	 simultaneous	 analysis	 of	
the	supply	and	demand	sides	of	the	labor	market,	i.e.,	companies	and	employees.	For	this,	a	
connection	is	established	between	the	data	of	the	IAB	establishment	panel	and	the	personnel	
data	of	the	IAB.	This	is	possible	because	in	both	data	sets,	the	same	company	identification	
numbers	are	used.	The	IAB	establishment	panel	is	an	annual,	representative	company	survey.	
Bellmann	2002	gives	a	general	introduction	to	the	dataset.	
Companies	 in	 the	 old	 federal	 states	have	been	 surveyed	 since	1993,	 and	 companies	 in	 the	
new	 federal	 states	 since	 1996	 as	 well.	 In	 2010,	 some	 16,296	 companies	 took	 part	 in	 the	
survey.	They	represent	a	random	sample	sorted	by	industry,	company	size	and	federal	state,	
and	by	using	the	grossing-up	factors,	can	be	seen	as	representative	for	the	population.	This	
population	consists	of	all	companies	that	on	June	30	of	the	previous	year	employed	at	least	
one	person	who	was	subject	to	social	security	assessments.	The	personal	data	is	taken	from	
the	 same	data	 sources	 as	 the	SIAB.	Accordingly,	 the	data	 set	 is	 designed	 according	 to	 the	
same	criteria	as	the	SIAB.	
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Figure A1: Wage Inequality by industry
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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Abbildung A 1: Ungleichheit pro Branche
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
Retail Hospitality
Transport Shipping 
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
2010200920082007200620052004200320022001200019991998
Aviation
53
Appendix
Abbildung A 1: Ungleichheit pro Branche
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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Table A1: Results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2010
1996–2010
Wage differential 85-15 50-15 85-50 
Measurable change 13.49*** 10.15*** 3.34
(2.17) (1.23) (2.03)
Composition effects
Export status –0.40 –0.36 –0.04
(0.26) (0.23) (0.31)
Collective bargaining 5.77*** 4.98*** 0.79
(1.86) (1.64) (0.61)
Technology –0.04 –0.03 –0.01
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Occupation 1.26 1.16 0.10
(1.24) (0.71) (0.88)
Education 1.33*** 0.70*** 0.63*
(0.44) (0.21) (0.35)
Age 2.75*** 0.83*** 1.92***
(0.48) (0.17) (0.39)
Sector –0.08 –0.33 0.25
(0.38) (0.29) (0.24)
Total effect 10.59*** 6.95*** 3.64***
(2.85) (2.05) (1.29)
Wage structure effect
Export status 1.79 3.87 –2.09
(6.07) (4.89) (3.07)
Collective bargaining 10.96** 10.46** 0.49
(3.95) (3.73) (1.62)
Technology –1.28 –2.10 0.82
(2.8) (2.22) (1.41)
Occupation –3.45 –4.93 1.48
(14.75) (14.34) (4.69)
Education 4.65*** 1.96 2.7***
(1.58) (1.17) (0.84)
Age –5.47* –5.03** –0.44
(2.93) (2.2) (1.65)
Sector –1.52 –1.72 0.20
(16.84) (9.36) (10.6)
Constants –5.78 –2.20 –3.58
(23.18) (16.35) (10.82)
Total effect –0.10 0.31 –0.41
(2.39) (2.28) (0.97)
Weighting error –0.04 –0.12 0.08
(0.71) (0.57) (0.47)
Specification error 3.04* 3.01** 0.03
(1.47) (1.25) (0.87)
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are 
employed in the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered. The values in parentheses reflect the standard error. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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Table A2: Results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2003, 2003–2010 
1996–2003 2003–2010
Wage differential 85-15 85-15 
Measurable change 5.68*** 7.82***
(1.72) (1.66)
Composition effects
Exporter –0.24 –0.52
(0.17) (0.35)
Collective bargaining 3.17*** 2.30***
(0.82) (0.67)
Technology 0.16 0.18
(0.26) (0.28)
Occupation 0.61 0.63
(0.62) (0.98)
Education 0.42** 0.95***
(0.19) (0.31)
Age 1.43*** 1.23***
(0.33) (0.17)
Sector 0.11 –0.41
(0.30) (0.44)
Total effect 5.67*** 4.35***
(1.66) (1.34)
Wage structure effects
Exporter –3.96 4.58**
(3.8) (2.06)
Collective bargaining 12.18** –1.51
(4.65) (3.2)
Technology –1.39 –0.84
(2.29) (1.89)
Occupation –4.87 4.89
(12.67) (7.88)
Education 1.90** 1.69**
(0.78) (0.80)
Age –0.84 –3.36
(1.46) (2.43)
Sector –1.88 –0.77
(15.02) (16.49)
Constants –1.83 –0.88
(22.01) (19.87)
Total effect –0.68 3.80**
(1.28) (1.55)
Weighting error –0.29 –0.03
(0.34) (0.20)
Specification error 0.98 –0.31
(0.72) (0.60)
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are 
employed in the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered. The values in parentheses reflect the standard error. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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